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 SUPERVISING DISCRIMINATION: 
REFLECTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE ACT IN THE BROADBAND 
DEBATE 
JAMES B. SPETA* 
“The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their 
graves.”1  For a telecoms lawyer asked to reflect on the 125th 
anniversary of the Interstate Commerce Act, F.W. Maitland’s famous 
line concerning common law procedure leaps to mind.  The 1887 
Interstate Commerce Act (ICA)2 continues to exert an outsize influence 
on the world of telecommunications—despite changes in both the ICA 
and telecoms.  The ICA’s original commitments of just and reasonable 
rates, nondiscriminatory service, and supervision by an administrative 
agency were, as is well-known, copied from the railroad statute into 
numerous other federal regulatory regimes—including the 
Communications Act of 1934.3  And while the ICA’s structure steadily 
changed in the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s eventual demise in 1996, the Communications Act 
remains the controlling statute for an enormous, and increasingly 
important, segment of the American economy—notwithstanding that 
telephones, telegraphs, and broadcasting (the objects of that Act) are no 
longer the important services. 
In fact, the most persistent issue for the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in recent times has been—and remains—in the 
realm of broadband services: specifically, the application of 
“nondiscrimination” rules to the Internet.  Both the FCC and 
commentators discuss this issue as if it were, in part, simply the 
 
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. 
1. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: TWO 
COURSES OF LECTURES 295, 296 (1st ed. 1909). 
2. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). 
3. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934); see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great 
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325, 1330–31 (1998) 
(the original ICA model of regulation); id. at 1333–34 (ICA copied into Communications Act 
and other statutes). 
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extension of nondiscrimination obligations codified in 1887 and 1934 
and behave as if nondiscrimination notions under those statutes might 
illuminate the modern debate.  I have done the same, and perhaps even 
worse by reaching back to the common law of common carriage,4 and 
there is at least some purchase to be had in all this, “because non-
discrimination was unquestionably the overriding goal of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, taking precedence even over the ‘just and reasonable’ 
[rate] requirement.”5 
But, as important as the nondiscrimination obligation was to the 
regulatory model initiated by the ICA, much of the current telecoms (or 
broadband) debate forgets that nondiscrimination was merely one 
aspect of a regulatory system in which all aspects of a carrier’s services 
were supervised.  And under that supervision, discrimination was 
frequently allowed—after all, the statute forbade only “unjust 
discrimination,”6 which gave the regulators considerable flexibility.  
Moreover, discrimination was frequently required in this regulatory 
model, in the name of universal service.  This richer history should allow 
a better consideration of the modern, broadband problem. 
I.  “NONDISCRIMINATION” IN THE CURRENT TELECOMS DEBATE 
One influential commentator in the debate over the proper rules for 
broadband regulation (Tim Wu) has made the pitch that “in coming 
decades . . . the main point of the telecommunications law should be as 
an anti-discrimination regime, and that the main challenge for regulators 
will be getting the anti-discrimination rules right.”7  He is hardly alone.8  
And the FCC’s only significant foray into Internet regulation has been 
to impose nondiscrimination rules on Internet access providers, first 
issuing a (since vacated) cease-and-desist order against one provider9 
 
4. James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 225 (2002). 
5. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1331–32. 
6. E.g., Interstate Commerce Act § 2, 24 Stat. at 379–80. 
7. Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in 
Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 16 (2006); see also id. at 37 (“[I]n 
the coming decades, anti-discrimination rules as between applications and transport services 
are the single greatest priority for the telecommunications law.”). 
8. See Jerry Kang, Race.Net Neutrality, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 1 (2007) 
(“The ‘net neutrality’ debate is undergoing a theoretical transition.  Since the late 1990s, we 
have moved from ‘open access,’ to ‘end to end,’ to ‘net neutrality,’ and by 2007, the question 
seems to have transformed into ‘anti-discrimination.’”). 
9. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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and following more recently with generally applicable rules providing 
that “[f]ixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in 
transmitting lawful network traffic.”10  Virtually no one calls for the 
other economic elements of the original regulatory paradigm, such as 
renewed restrictions on entry and exit, or the return of rate-regulation.  
And while few call for the FCC to be abolished, everyone (including the 
FCC) agrees that its touch should be lighter, more ex post, more 
deferential to private companies.  The FCC itself describes the Open 
Internet rules as “high level,” indicating that they will be applied case-
by-case through private negotiation, private standard-setting, and, only 
as necessary, complaint and enforcement actions through the agency.11 
Those pushing for modern, Internet nondiscrimination rules 
frequently invoke their statutory history—from the ICA through the 
original Communications Act.  The FCC invoked the Interstate 
Commerce Act when it forbade “unreasonable discrimination” by 
broadband carriers, although the reference came in rejecting calls for 
stronger nondiscrimination rules.12  More recently, in setting up his 
project for broadband anti-discrimination rules, Tim Wu argued that 
“[a]s an anti-discrimination regime, common-carriage is important both 
historically and conceptually.”13  Similarly, Susan Crawford has said that 
modern market conditions require returning to the old ways—that “[w]e 
need to return to the basic notion of a non-discriminatory network 
underlying communications. . . .  [T]he old paradigm of regulation is new 
again—with a few changes.”14  The foresighted work of Ithiel de Sola 
Pool expressly argued for common carrier rules for new electronic 
networks, where monopoly conditions warranted.15  Even the opponents 
of network neutrality rules make the connection between those rules 
and the historic nondiscrimination regime of the Interstate Commerce 
Act.  For example, Bruce Owen has written that “[p]roponents of net 
 
10. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906 (2010). 
11. Id. at 17908–09. 
12. Id. at 17948–49 & n.239 (“As recently as 1995, Congress adopted the venerable 
‘reasonableness’ standard when it recodified provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.”). 
13. Wu, supra note 7, at 30; see also id. (“Western Union’s discriminatory practices were 
eventually remedied through the device of ‘common carriage.’  In 1888, Congress gave the 
Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate subsidized telegraph lines, and in 
1910, Congress declared telegraph companies to be common carriers.  The ‘common carriage’ 
concept was preserved in the 1934 Communications Act and still forms the basis for the 
regulation of telephone carriers, and thus necessitates a close look.”). 
14. Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 937 (2009). 
15. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 246 (1983). 
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neutrality may recognize their own fears and goals . . . [in] the legislative 
history of the first modern attempt by the federal government to 
regulate directly the behavior of large firms, in this case railroads.  The 
result was the 1887 Act to Regulate Commerce.”16 
II.  THE SHIFTING NORMS OF NONDISCRIMINATION  
UNDER ICA STATUTES 
A call for broadband nondiscrimination rules as an extension of the 
nondiscrimination requirement of the ICA and of the Communications 
Act misses two important pieces of the history of those regimes.  As 
already noted, the statutory text forbade only “unjust” (or 
“unreasonable”) discrimination, and the regulators sometimes used that 
discretion to approve discriminatory rates.17  More importantly, the goal 
of universal service, especially in the Communications Act, meant that 
the regulators affirmatively valued discrimination—discrimination that 
helped maintain artificially low prices for some services while ensuring 
that the carrier met its total revenue needs. 
The common law did not impose a strict nondiscrimination duty on 
common carriers—so long as rates were reasonable, they did not have to 
be equal.18  The ICA was undoubtedly meant to do more.  Specific 
provisions forbade much long and short-haul discrimination, and the 
statute generally forbade unreasonable discrimination.19  It is sometimes 
said of the Interstate Commerce Act that “[t]he core concern in the 
nondiscrimination area has been to maintain equality of pricing for 
shipments subject to substantially similar costs and competitive 
conditions, while permitting carriers to introduce differential pricing 
where dissimilarities in those key variables exist.”20 
 
16. Bruce Owen, Antecedents to Net Neutrality, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 14, 15.  
Owen did not mean this as a compliment. 
17. The principle that the courts would defer to the ICC’s findings on discrimination was 
established early.  “Whenever a rate, rule or practice is attacked as unreasonable or as 
unjustly discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to the Commission. . . .  Preliminary 
resort to the Commission is required . . . because the enquiry is essentially one of fact and of 
discretion in technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left 
to the Commission.”  Great N. Ry. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922). 
18. See Speta, supra note 4, at 258. 
19. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 
131–48 (1991); Clyde B. Aitchison, The Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act: 1887–1937, 
5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 298 (1937); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1332–33. 
20. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 1311, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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But introducing the idea that the tariffed rate may respond to 
competitive conditions—that discounts can be approved “on grounds of 
reduced costs and the need to meet intermodal competition”21—
eliminates any need for “costs” to serve as the basis of a 
nondiscrimination requirement.  Moreover, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission early implemented “value-of-service pricing,” under which 
high-priced commodities were charged more (regardless of cost of 
transport).22  And even further deviations from nondiscrimination were 
permitted: “The Hoch–Smith Resolution, passed by Congress in 1925, 
explicitly required the ICC to give consideration to the relationship 
between agricultural freight rates and agricultural incomes and has been 
interpreted as giving clear legislative sanction to the maintenance of the 
value-of-service rate structure.”23  These practices had economic and 
noneconomic explanations.  Economically, value-of-service pricing 
“may have been a roughly adequate method of concentrating the fixed 
costs of railroad service on those customers whose demands for rail 
transportation were least elastic,”24 and permitting rate concessions 
upon the development of intermodal competition allowed the railroad 
to keep the traffic at some rate (maintaining at least a marginal 
contribution to fixed costs).  Noneconomically, low prices for 
agricultural commodities no doubt were popular. 
That did not mean that nondiscrimination was a dead letter, to be 
sure.  Formal nondiscrimination requirements persisted.  Even when the 
ICC and later the FCC (and the courts) approved contract rates, the law 
required that a carrier offer the rate to any party that could meet the 
exact terms of the rate.25  Extreme formalism came in the 
Communications Act context, when the FCC approved what were 
known as “contract tariffs”—service packages that, while tariffed, in 
most cases could be met by only one potential customer.26  Moreover, 
 
21. Id. (emphasis added). 
22. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 22, 
26 (1971) (“‘Value-of-service’ pricing in the railroad industry . . . [was] the practice of 
proportioning rail rates to the price of the commodity transported . . . .”). 
23. ANN F. FRIEDLAENDER & RICHARD H. SPADY, FREIGHT TRANSPORT 
REGULATION: EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND COMPETITION IN THE RAIL AND TRUCKING 
INDUSTRIES 2 (1980). 
24. Posner, supra note 22, at 26. 
25. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 738 F.2d at 1317–19 (approving contract rates in ICC 
context). 
26. See Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1058, 1061, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (approving contract tariffs under the Communications Act). 
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substantive nondiscrimination cases did occur, and the regulators did, 
from time to time, hold that tariffs for similar services were 
discriminatory.27 
The point, though, is that nondiscrimination, while an important 
rule, was very much applied based on the overall context, and that 
context was part economic and part noneconomic.  Economically, 
railroads had high fixed costs, which needed to be recovered.  
Noneconomically, the Interstate Commerce Act’s politics excluded 
recovery of those fixed costs against the most captive customers (the 
short-haul, agricultural customers).  As competition developed, further 
concessions from the traditional modes of proceeding, including 
nondiscrimination, were required.  Consider the D.C. Circuit’s 
statement in one of the telecommunications contract tariff cases: “We 
have the impression that there is a certain air of unreality about this 
case.  The FCC (one way or another) will undoubtedly permit AT&T to 
compete effectively against its competitors . . . .”28 
Little need be added about universal service, for the point is now 
clear.  Regulators wanted universal service (and, in the case of railroads, 
cheap agricultural service, and, in the case of telephones, cheap local 
residential service).  This meant cross-subsidies, some of which 
necessarily violated any notion of cost-based nondiscrimination.  In 
telephony, business rates were higher than residential rates, even if the 
business and the residence shared the same address.  Long-distance 
rates were made uniform, even though the costs were higher on lightly 
used trunk routes.29 
III.  LESSONS 
What does this mean for the debate over broadband 
nondiscrimination rules?  Without doubt it means that one cannot 
simply say that the Interstate Commerce Act and the Communications 
Act adopted nondiscrimination rules for essential services, and 
therefore such nondiscrimination rules should now be adopted for 
broadband carriers (because broadband service is becoming essential).  
And one also cannot say that nondiscrimination rules are the response 
 
27. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (remanding in light 
of conclusion that certain contract tariffs’ price differences had not been adequately justified). 
28. Id. at 42. 
29. On these points, see generally STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 369 (3d ed. 2012). 
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to broadband monopoly, for of course the monopoly is incomplete.  The 
business access market is likely more robustly competitive (as it was in 
traditional telephony in the 1990s) than the residential market.  Under 
the traditional scheme’s permission of rate discounts to respond to 
competition, the result would be to allow carriers to charge businesses 
less than residential customers.  But, of course, the universal service 
imperative of the traditional regime would not in fact have permitted 
that result, for what were largely noneconomic (or at least 
distributional) grounds. 
These conflicting forces have always been conflicting, but they could 
be resolved by a traditional regulator such as the ICC or the FCC in a 
system in which entry was legally and practically limited, and in which 
the regulator had the tools to ensure that carriers would receive 
adequate overall returns.  Applying nondiscrimination rules while 
attempting to maintain the essentially unregulated nature of Internet 
carriers is a much trickier enterprise, and it is not clear how the new 
system can adapt to balance these concerns.  On the one hand, the 
FCC’s recent foray attempts to meet this concern by only stating a high-
level principle of nondiscrimination and promising to adjudicate 
disputes.  Adjudication may allow the FCC to forbid only particularly 
problematic practices, minimizing its intrusion into the business 
practices of the carriers, and to consider any legitimate business 
justifications offered by the carriers for specific services.  On the other 
hand, the FCC has rejected the notion that discrimination is only a 
concern when it can be expressly linked with anticompetitive 
foreclosure (which would be an instance in which the carrier is making 
more than normal profits).30  As a result, the Open Internet Rules have 
the potential to impose important business restrictions on the carriers, 
while the FCC no longer comprehensively supervises them and assures 
the adequacy of their revenues.   
In short, while the Interstate Commerce Act’s nondiscrimination 
requirement provides something of a model for the broadband world, 
the rule was part of a system—a system in which nondiscrimination was 
never absolute and that allowed compensation for its costs.  The FCC 
and advocates for broadband nondiscrimination may take one part of a 
system and not others, but should acknowledge—and explain—their 
selectivity.   
 
30. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17949 (2010). 
